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Abstract  
The United States and Germany are widely seen as the developed worlds’ two preeminent 
economic superpowers, yet the two countries modes of corporate governance are 
drastically different. These differences are reflected in corporate board structure, which 
we analyze below. The “Anglo-American” model of a one-tier board structure is largely 
a reflection of the neo-liberal norms of shareholder primacy and free market capitalism. 
The German two-tier model is in many ways a reflection of stakeholder primacy, 
codetermination and managerialism. Despite substantial differences in size, structure, 
composition, norms and duties, there has been an increasing convergence in certain 
board functions, which we analyze in this paper. Our Paper is broken into four parts: (1) 
an analysis of the American Corporate Board, (2) an analysis of the German Corporate 
Boards, (3) a comparison of the differences in the two systems and (4) an analysis of the 
convergence of international corporate governance norms reflected in both systems.  
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I. The American Corporate Board 
1.1 Composition 
 Corporate boards in the United States are “one-tier” boards3. This one-tier board 
invests both managerial and supervisory responsibilities in one unified board of directors. 
This single board is traditionally divided between the (1) Chief Executive Officer 
(“CEO”) and executives directors, (2) a Chairman or Lead Director (often times the 
CEO) and (3) Independent Directors.4 The CEO or chief executive is now commonly the 
only executive on the board as a result of the movement towards independent boards and 
independent board committees. The other executives, such as the CFO, COO or CLO 
may report directly to the board, but normally are not members of the board. The norm on 
American boards is for the CEO to serve as the sole representation of the company’s 
executives. Roughly 50% of boards also have a separate chairman of the board, while the 
remaining 50% have designated their CEO as both CEO and chairman.5 Within the 50% 
that have two separate offices, the U.S. chairman generally has a wide variety of roles 
including leading the board meetings and ensuring orderly succession for the CEO. 
Finally, the remaining board members have largely become independent directors 6 . 
Willem Calkoen describes independent directors as maintaining two roles: (1) to actively 
challenge strategy proposed and executed by the officers of the company and (2) to 
monitor the execution of the business.7 In order for a director to be independent, under 
New York Stock Exchange (herein the “NYSE”) rules they must have “no material 
relationship with the listed company.” 8 Case law such as Oracle Corp in the Delaware                                                         
3 “One-tier” boards will also be referred to interchangeably throughout this paper as “unitary” boards or 
“single-tier” boards 
4 Willem J.L Calkoen, The One-Tier Board in the Changing and Converging World of Corporate 
Governance at 187-200 (Kluwer et. al. 2012) 
5 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, Spencer Stuart (November 2015) at 13 
6 The rise of the independent director has been meteoric; in 1950 only 20% of directors could be deemed 
independent, but by 2005 that number was 75% and by 2015 that number was 84% of the Fortune 500. 
Only roughly 50% of publicly traded companies, however, have a separate CEO and Chairman of the 
board, but that trend will likely continue to expand as long as shareholders continue to demand separation 
of the two roles. See Calkoen at 200; Spencer Stuart at 12; See Generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005:Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
Stan. L. R. 1467 (2007) (chronicling the rise of independent directors in Corporate America) (We discuss 
the rise of independent directors more in depth in Part III of this paper) 
7 See Calkoen at 200 
8 NYSE 303A.02 
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Court of Chancery has furthered heightened the standard of who is independent.9 The 
independent director must also have time for the job, a wide array of knowledge and 
experience, and should not have too many other board positions. Most executives are 
limited to no more than three other directorships.10 
1.2 Size 
The boards of most listed companies have between eight and twelve board 
members, with the average board size on the S&P 500 being 10.811  members. The 
general consensus amongst both academics and practitioners is that “[b]oards need to be 
large enough to accommodate the necessary skill sets and competences, but still be small 
enough to promote cohesion, flexibility and effective participation.”12  The venerable 
corporate lawyer Martin Lipton has argued that “a smaller board will be most likely to 
allow directors to get to know each other well, to have more effective discussions with all 
directors contributing, and to reach a true consensus from their deliberations.”13 Lipton & 
Lorsch have argued that this ideal size should be no more than ten directors (while 
favoring eight or nine).14 American shareholders and management seem to generally 
agree with Lipton, as American boards are much smaller than their German 
counterparts. 15  The expanding importance of specialized knowledge on committees, 
however, may require increasingly larger American boards, which we discuss in Part IV.   
1.3 Board Demographics 
Spencer Stuarts’ 2015 Board index highlights the current demographics of 
Corporate America. First, within the S&P 500 listed companies, almost half of boards 
                                                        
9 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2003 WL 21396449 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2003) (finding that a 
directors’ independence can be compromised by personal relationships such as school ties) 
10 See Generally ISS, Director Overboarding (US) available at: 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/us-overboarding.pdf; General Motors Corporation, Governance 
and Corporate Responsibility Committee Charter (December 2015) available at: 
https://www.gm.com/content/dam/gm/en_us/english/Group4/InvestorsPDFDocuments/GCRC.pdf ; 2015 
Spencer Stuart Board Index, Spencer Stuart (November 2015) at 13 
11 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, Spencer Stuart (November 2015) 
12 See Spencer Stuart at 10 
13 Lipton, Martin, and J. W. Lorsch A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, Business 
Lawyer 48, no. 1 at 2 (November 1992) 
14 id. 
15 We discuss this point in detail in Part III of the paper 
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have split the role between CEO and chairman.16 Over half (53%) of new independent 
directors are senior executives and professionals.17 38% of directors are either current of 
former CEO’s, chairmen, presidents or COO’s, 34% are other corporate executives, 23% 
come from the financial sector, 9% come from academia, 4% are consultants, 2% are 
lawyers, and 9% come from other fields. Gender diversity on boards is increasing, as 
31% of new directors on boards are female.18 Boards are also increasingly demanding 
greater female representation, as being a female was the second most wanted attribute in 
a new director after being an active CEO/COO.19 The boards are also overwhelmingly 
older, with the average age of independent directors being 63.1 years and only 15% of 
boards having an average age of 59 years or younger.20  Minorities are increasingly 
prominent on boards, as 18% of new independent directors hired in 2015 were minorities 
(up from 12% in 2014).21 
Independent director representation has skyrocketed, with 84% of all S&P 500 
boards being comprised of independent directors.22 The average board is comprised of 
9.1 independent directors and 1.7 non-independent directors. 23  The increasing 
prominence of major institutional and activist investors is also reflected in board 
elections, as 92% of directors stand for election on an annual basis, rising from 51% in 
2005. 24  Shareholder input is also increasingly reflected in the rise of mandatory 
retirement ages for directors (73%).25 29% of boards also now have truly independent 
chairs, compared with 9% in 2005.26 
Board composition also reflects the rising prominence of committees. In the S&P 
500, every Board had the three NYSE Committees: (1) compensation/HR, (2) audit and 
(3) nominating/governance. 71% of boards have more than just the three NYSE 
                                                        
16 See Spencer Stuart at 12 
17 Id. at 15-17 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.; See Also PWC, PWC’s 2015 Annual Corporate Directors Survey available at: 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/annual-corporate-directors-survey/downloads.html 
22 Id. at 8-23 
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
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mandated boards, and 35% have five or more. 27  The most prominent non-NYSE 
mandated committees in descending order are: the executive committee (34%), the 
finance committee (31%), the risk committee (12%) and the public policy/ social & 
corporate responsibility committee (10%).28 Cyber-security has also risen in prominence, 
with 69% of survey respondents assigning cyber-security to an existing committee.29  
1.4 Selection & Appointment  
Under Delaware law, which we use as a proxy for state corporate law for reasons 
discussed below, the shareholders elect directors.30  The “most important shareholder 
power is the right to elect directors, generally at annual meetings.”31 Currently, only 
individuals nominated by the company for the board of directors are included in the 
company’s proxy statement and card. Shareholders may nominate their own members of 
the board, but generally do not do so because of the substantial expense involved in 
soliciting proxies.32 The “vast majority of director elections are uncontested”, and many 
have argued that “incumbents do not currently face any meaningful risks of being 
replaced via the ballot box.”33 Currently, the majority of public firms in the United States 
have plurality voting rules that favor management nominees and incumbents.34 
David Larcker has described the six-step process that management undergoes to 
select new directors as entailing: (1) identifying the needs of the company, (2) identifying 
gaps in director capabilities, (3) identifying potential candidates either through director 
networks or with a professional recruiter, (4) ranking candidates in order of preference, 
(5) meeting with candidates and offering the job and (6) putting each candidate up for a 
                                                        
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 25 
29 Id. at 25-29 (many interviewed directors discussed the possibly of a new cyber-security committee being 
created in the future). 
30 See §211 of the DGCL (outlining the shareholders right to elect Directors under Delaware General 
Corporate Law) 
31 See John W. White & Marc S. Rosenberg, The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Corporate 
Governance 2010, Chapter 25 (2010)  
32 Activist investors are an important caveat to this rule, but we will not address the role of activist investors 
in this paper because it is of limited importance to this topic. 
33 See White & Rosenberg 
34 Cai, Jie, Jacqueline L. Garner, and Ralph A. Walkling, Electing directors, J. Fin., 64.5 2389, 2390 (2009) 
(describing the nomination and election process of directors).  
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shareholder vote.35 Directors are screened, ranked, and then placed in order before they 
are put before a shareholder vote.36 
 Increasingly, major shareholders have begun to play larger roles in helping to 
select boards of directors, as well as shape the rules of director elections. Activist 
shareholders, along with ISS, have focused particularly on adopting majority voting for 
director elections. As institutional shareholders increase their power and input relative to 
management, they will likely begin to have an even greater say in director elections.  
1.5 Compensation 
Director compensation on American boards is largely determined by firm size. 
Director compensation in large-cap corporate America has continued to grow, with 
average compensation for an S&P 500 director rising to $277,235 in 2015, which has 
more than doubled in the past 10 years.37 Cash payments represent only 38% of total 
compensation, which has consistently declined as a percentage of overall compensation 
over the last 10 years.38 Stock awards, options and other compensation linked to company 
performance has risen to 59% of total compensation for directors, while 90% of boards 
have share ownership guidelines for directors that are meant to align director 
compensation with shareholder interest.39 Compensation for directors in companies with 
market capitalization of less than $1 billion averages $125,260 while Mid-Cap director 
compensation (those companies with market capitalization of $1 billion to $5 billion) was 
$182,500.40 
1.6 General Responsibilities  
The board is often described as having two broad mandates: the mandate to advise 
and the mandate to oversee.41 These mandates are also shaped by certain legal duties, 
outlined below in the discussion of legal duties. The structure and internal division of 
responsibilities of a board will vary by company and industry, but the board still has a                                                         
35 David F. Larcker, Board of Directors: Duties & Liabilities, Corporate Governance Research Program 
Stanford Graduate School of Business at 3 (2011)  
36 Id. 
37 See Spencer Stuart at 30-32 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 PWC at 4 
41 See Larcker 
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series of basic responsibilities shaped by these two broad mandates. Mike Boland has 
outlined six general responsibilities falling under these two broad mandates: (1) recruit, 
supervise, retain, evaluate and compensate the managers, (2) provide direction for the 
organization, (3) establish a policy based governance system, (4) govern the organization 
and the relationship with the CEO, (5) uphold the fiduciary duty to protect the 
organization’s assets and member’s investment, and (6) the monitor and control 
function.42 Mace has more simply stated that “directors serve as a source of advice and 
counsel, serve as some sort of discipline, and act in crisis situations.”43 This disciplinary 
function has evolved over the past 30 years to the point that boards have become “less 
passive” and have moved from being a “managerial rubber stamps to active and 
independent monitors.”44 Three of these responsibilities are now mandated to have their 
own committee under the NYSE rules, which require a compensation/HR committee, an 
audit committee and a nominating/governance committee.45  
 
1.7 Legal Duties 
1.7.1 State Law and the Preeminence of Delaware Corporate Law  
In the United States, corporate law is state law. I will be analyzing the legal duties 
of directors using Delaware state corporate law, which serves as an effective proxy of 
American state corporate law.46 
In Delaware, the rules governing the directors of a corporation are a combination 
of common law and statutory law. The Delaware General Corporation Law (Herein 
referred to as the “DCGL”) is the statutory law that governs the directors of a 
corporation. The Delaware state courts, and in particular the Court of Chancery, have 
created the common law that governs Delaware directors.                                                         
42 Mike Boland, The Role of the Board of Directors, AG Decision Maker Iowa St. (September 2009) 
43 Myles L. Mace, The President and the Board of Directors, Harvard Business Review (March 1972)  
44 See Adams, Renee, Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of the Board of Directors 
in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey at 7 (November 2008) (National Bureau 
of Economic Research working paper 14486); See also Gordon at fn. 5.  
45NYSE 303A.04; NYSE 303A.05; NYSE 303A.06;NYSE 303A.07 (NYSE provisions on required 
committee’s for listed companies)  
46 See Lewis S. Black, Jr. Why Corporations Choose Delaware, Delaware Department of State Division of 
Corporations(2007) (highlighting the pre-eminence of Delaware General Corporation Law in American 
corporate law). 
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In Delaware, the director of a corporation has a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. 
Delaware law has outlined three major roles of a director created by their fiduciary duties 
to shareholders: (1) “Big Picture” Decision Making, (2) Delegation and (3) Oversight. 
These three roles are the direct result of the “Triad” of Fiduciary Duties created by 
Delaware statutory and common law. The “Triad” of Fiduciary Duties owed by directors 
are: the duties of due care, good faith and loyalty, each of which I will address 
separately.47  
1.7.2 Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule: 
The first fiduciary duty of a director is the duty of care. The duty of care requires 
that, when managing a corporation’s affairs, the director (1) act in good faith, (2) with the 
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances, and (3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation.48 In order to satisfy this duty of care, a director must meet 
certain basic criteria, namely: they must have reasonable knowledge of the company’s 
business, act on an informed, good-faith basis, obtain credible information on each issue, 
adequately deliberate the relevant issues, and understand the consequences that will flow 
from each decision before making the decision.49 It is crucial for a director to exercise 
“substantive due care”, because they are then eligible for the strong shield of the business 
judgment rule to protect the board members from liability.50 
 The business judgment rule is a presumption that if business decisions 
made by the board are made by: (1) disinterested, independent directors; (2) with 
informed due care; and (3) with a good faith belief that the decision will serve the 
corporations best interest, the courts will not second guess a decision made by the 
board.51 In Delaware, and crucial to the directors “Big Picture” decision making and 
oversight:                                                          
47 See Generally Ira M. Millstein, Jolly J. Gregory & Ashley R. Altschuler, Fiduciary Duties Under U.S. 
Law (unpublished working paper with the American Bar Associations International Developments Sub-
Committee on Corporate Governance) (2014) 
48 See Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton & Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule: fiduciary 
duties of corporate directors, Aspen Law & Business 2002 
49 Id. 
50 See Generally Block et. al.  
51 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (describing the business judgment rule) 
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“ [The courts] do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. [They] do 
not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the 
decisionmaking context is process due care only.”52 
 
Directors in Delaware are protected from liability for unwise or poor business 
decisions. Directors may, however, be held liable for a breach of duty of care when they 
fail to perform their duties responsibly, in good faith, and in a reasonably prudent 
manner. 53  Delaware statute has authorized shareholders to adopt a provision in the 
certificate of incorporation that eliminates or limits the “personal liability of a director to 
the corporation or its stockholders for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,” but not for a 
breach of other duties. 54  This duty of care has created a requirement that directors 
approve a company’s significant business plans and extraordinary actions. 55  Some 
examples of extraordinary actions include: business combinations, the retirement or 
creation of debt or equity, entry into new lines of business and significant acquisitions of 
stock.  
 While fulfilling their duty of care, directors are empowered to delegate board 
functions to committees, corporate offices and independent advisors. Under the DGCL, 
the board may rely in good faith on officers, employees, committees of the board of 
directors or competent outside advisors, as long as due care is exercised during 
selection.56 A director may not, however, delegate a task that would strip them of their 
capabilities to use their judgment on management matters, or on matters that must be 
performed by the Board in a statute, the by-laws or the articles of incorporation.57 
 
                                                        
52 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 259 (Del. 2000) 
53 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 880 (Del. 1985) (outlining the standard for a directors duty of care) 
(note that in response to the decision, the legislature enacted §102(b)(7) of the DGCL that allows a 
corporation to enact provision “eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director” for a breach of 
their Duty of Care). 
54 §102(b)(7) 
55 Millstein at 9-13 
56 §141(e) 
57 Millstein at 9-13; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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1.7.3 The Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty for a director mandates that “the best interest of the 
corporation and its shareholders take precedence over any other interest possessed by a 
director.” 58  A director may not engage in self-dealing, misappropriate corporate 
opportunities or assets, have conflicts of interest, or otherwise profit in an action that is 
not substantively or “entirely” fair. Unlike for a breach of duty of care, a director’s 
personal liability for breaches of duty of loyalty may not be limited by a corporate charter 
or by-law provision.59  
 
1.7.4 The Duty of Good Faith 
A director has a duty to act in good faith. According to Chief Justice Veasey of 
the Delaware Supreme Court, good faith “requires an honesty of purpose and eschews a 
disingenuous mindset of seeming to act for the corporation good, but not caring for the 
well being of the constituents the fiduciary.”60 Traditionally, this duty of “good faith” has 
been linked to the duty of loyalty, but according to some scholars it may be “considered 
to be an additional duty” to the duty of loyalty.61 
 
1.7.5 Federal Duties & The Audit Committee  
 Following the Enron scandal and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (herein called 
“SOX”) by Congress, some scholars such as Lisa Fairfax have argued that directors’ 
fiduciary duties are becoming increasingly “federalized”, as Congress has begun to 
encroach on the traditional role played by the state legislatures in outlining the fiduciary 
duties of corporate directors. In particular, SOX enhances the monitoring role of directors 
by “making directors who serve on the audit committee of a corporation responsible for 
                                                        
58 See Stone v. Ritter, No. CIV.A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2006) (outlining the Duty 
of Loyalty) 
59 §102(b)(7) (explicitly not allowing a corporation to shield a director “for any breach of the director's duty 
of loyalty”) 
60 See E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate 
Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y at 9-19 (2003).  
61 Id. 
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closely overseeing auditors’ work as well as any disagreements related to that work.”62 
Key provisions of SOX which federalize director duties include Section 301 requiring an 
independent audit committee, Section 302 which “implicate[s] the directors’ duty to keep 
abreast of corporate financial affairs” by creating an obligation for the CEO & CFO to 
oversee the audit committee, Section 305 expanding the SEC’s power to bar and penalize 
directors, Section 306 limiting the ability of directors to trade in company securities, and 
Section 404 which expands board liability for the annual report. SOX “not only 
federalizes [some] corporate fiduciary duties, but also adds substance to them.” 63  
This encroachment by the federal government into a territory that is normally the 
sole purview of the states could potentially shift power away from directors and to 
shareholders. 64  Payne described the original heightening of director standards in the 
1960’s as a “movement toward an ever increasing moral delicacy and sophistication in 
the recondite area of the legal regulation of the American corporation” leading to a 
scenario where “the deliberate forces of justice and morality seem to be tightening the 
screws on corporate law” and burdening directors with new obligations. This shift, seen 
over the past twenty years in the usurpment of power from both boards and state 
governments by the federal government is arguably just a new development in this 
continuing trend.65  
 
1.7.6 NYSE Standards 
 The NYSE worked in tandem with the SEC to further heighten the duties placed 
upon the directors of listing members with rule changes in 2002 that required a majority 
of independent directors, narrowed the definition of independent directors, and created 
independent corporate governance & compensation committees.66 The NASDAQ also                                                         
62 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through 
Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. Rev 393,500 (2005) 
63 See Fairfax at 401-406 
64 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1125, 1144 (2003) (arguing that SOX could lead to a power shift from 
directors to shareholders)  
65See Bayne, David C. A Philosophy of Corporate Control, U. PA. L. Rev. 112.1 at 5 (1963) 66 See Morrison & Foerster, Client Alert: NYSE Adopts Changes to its Corporate Governance and Listing 
Standards (August 2002) available at: http://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/2002/08/nyse-adopts-
changes-to-its-corporate-governance (describing the rules changes implemented by the SEC, NASDAQ & 
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passed similar rules that heightened board standards and created two new required 
committees.67 The exchanges should be considered a fourth key actor, along with the 
shareholders, the state government and the federal government in creating and enforcing 
governance standards on directors.  
1.8 History of the American Board  
1.8.1 Historical Development of the American Board 
The board of directors in the United States has risen as a response to what Berle & 
Means described in their seminal study as “the separation of ownership and control” in 
the American corporation.68 Because of the historically dispersed ownership of capital in 
America, there have been collective action problems for shareholders to monitor 
corporate management. 69  The board in the American context can be thought of 
representing the widely dispersed shareholder by solving the “practical difficulty of 
shareholders monitoring” management on their behalf. This board in its modern existence 
is best viewed as “an independent, rather than a representative, body”70 of shareholders, 
but this independence should work towards the aid of shareholders. Although there is 
significant conflict in the literature regarding the purpose for the existence of the unitary 
board, one conclusion that can be drawn is that the American board exists in its current 
structure largely out of cultural inheritance and path dependency. 
“The norm that the ultimate power over corporate management resides in an 
elected board has always existed in the American corporate statutes.”71 Although New 
York State was the first American state to codify the election of directors to control the 
management of a corporation, this legislation was merely a reflection of accepted 
corporate practice dating back to English colonization of North America.72 This Anglo-
American historical precedent has played an enormous role in shaping the American                                                                                                                                                                      
NYSE); See Also Calkoen for a narrative history of the SEC, NYSE & NASDAQ’s efforts to implement 
these rule changes. 
67 Id. 
68 See Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) 
69 id.(dispersed ownership stands in contrast with other nations whose capital markets are dominated by 
large, controlling blockholders more able to effectively monitor corporate management) 
70 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 
Hofstra L. Rev. at 16 (2004-2005) 
71 Id. at 10 
72 Id. 
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board structure. For example, the Charter of the Bank of the United States was directly 
modeled on the Bank of England’s provision calling for an elected board of directors to 
manage the corporation.73 The first Bank of the United States’ charter, however, was 
unique in having the board of directors elect the equivalent of the CEO.74 This charter 
would serve as a model charter for future corporate charters, with its single-tier structure 
and re-enforcement of emerging norms favoring shareholder primacy. 
1.8.2 Shareholder Primacy 
Unlike in Germany and other continental European countries that seek to give 
major roles on the board to stakeholders, the model of shareholder primacy is uniquely 
Anglo-American in tradition and has only been further entrenched in the late 20th and 
early 21st century by the Anglo-American norms of free market capitalism.  
American notions of shareholder primacy are unique and play an important role in 
American board structure. Virginia Harper Ho outlines the ideology of shareholder 
primacy, stating “it is most often equated simply with the view that the purpose of the 
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth.”75 The corporate norm of shareholder 
primacy has been subject to long and contentious debate. According to D. Gordon Smith, 
during the early history of the republic “corporate charters and incorporation statutes 
often identified a public interest associated with incorporation…suggest[ing] that the 
corporations were operated on some basis other than shareholder primacy.” 76 Case law 
did not begin to reflect notions of shareholder primacy until the 1830’s, when cases such 
as Gray v. Portland Bank began to hold that “the corporation could not act except for the 
benefit of existing shareholders.”77  The notion of shareholder primacy became fully 
engrained in the American corporate lexicon by early 20th century, although there were 
important caveats to the norm. In particular, during the 1950’s and 1960’s at the height of 
corporate managerialism, Jeffrey Gordon argues that boards would functionally value 
                                                        
73 Id. at 16-18 
74 Id.  
75 Virginia Harper Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance beyond the Shareholder-
Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. Corp. L. at 73 (2010-2011). 
76 D. Gordon Smith, Shareholder Primacy Norm, The, 23 J. Corp. L. at 296 (1997-1998). 
77 Id. at 74 
 18
stakeholder interests in management practices. 78  Despite these caveats, the state 
legislatures never took action like in Germany to require direct representation of 
important stakeholder interests such as employees, or allow the involvement of the 
government, creditors and others. Instead, stakeholder interests were and remain 
governed by legislation and contract law, not board representation. Since at least the 
1980’s, the American norm has been that the corporation should “have as its objective the 
conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder 
gain.”79 
Adolfe Berle and Merrick Dodd’s classic normative debate in the Harvard Law 
Review over the role of shareholders versus stakeholders in the 1930’s was illustrative of 
the challenges to the ultimately triumphant consensus of shareholder primacy in 
American corporate law.80 Berle understood corporate power conceded to management as 
“intended to be used only on behalf of all” shareholders and that actions by corporate 
management “intended to be greatened for the purpose of benefiting one set of 
participants as against another…. [w]ould be to violate every intendment of the whole 
corporate situation.” 81 Berle’s conception of corporate law as a “variant of trust law” 
conceptualized corporate managers owing fiduciaries duties to the shareholder 
beneficiaries,82 and is in many ways reflective of the modern DGCL. 
Dodd instead argued from a normative perspective, viewing the duties of 
corporate managers as wider than that to shareholders.83 Berle may have described the 
corporate entity as how it existed, but in Dodd’s mind “it [was] undesirable, even with 
the laudable purpose of giving stockholders much-needed protection against self-seeking 
managers, to give increased emphasis at the present time to the view that the business 
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders.”84 Dodd 
instead expressed the need to focus on worker protection and representation, as well as                                                         
78 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005:Of Shareholder 
Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. R. 1467 (2007). 
79 ALI Principles Of Corporate Governance: Analysis And Recommendations § 2.01 (1994) 
80 See Generally Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 
31 J. Corp. L. 637, 674 (2005-2006) (describing the “classic debate” between Merrick Dodd and Adolf 
Berle)  
81 A. A. Jr. Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. at 1063 (1930-1931) 
82 Id.  
83 E. Merrick Jr. Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 Harv. L. Rev. at 1164 (1932) 
84 Id. 
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public policy and the public good. There has been intensive debate over which side is 
correct, but it is clear that in the United States Berle’s notion of shareholder primacy over 
stakeholders has reigned supreme, and this principle is reflected in American board 
structure. As will be discussed later in this paper, Germany has been more sympathetic to 
Dodd’s view, favoring stakeholder interest and representation on the two-tiered board. 
During the late 19th century when Germany implemented a two-tiered board, it “was the 
legislators intention to protect both shareholders and the public interest”, and this view 
still maintains prominence in the German board structure.85 
1.9 Advantages of the Single-Tier Board 
The advantages of the single-tier board versus the two-tiered board can be 
categorized as: (1) having a superior flow of information, (2) faster decision making and 
(3) better understanding and involvement in the business by the board.86 
A single-tier boards’ superior flow of information comes from its’ structure and 
size. Unlike a two-tiered board, a single-tier board has a greater number of meetings 
where every member of the board is present. The board, which also houses the various 
committees, imports a wide array of knowledge on both the manager and the monitor 
(because all board members must be both in the US)87. By housing both the CEO and the 
independent monitors, the board also has constant contact with the executives of the 
company, which can promote individual relationships, better understanding of the 
business and a greater prominence of the supervisory function of the board in 
management decision making. As Jungmann has argued, because “the non-executive 
directors are involved in the decision-making process, they have more incentives to 
supply themselves with all relevant information, since they cannot argue afterwards that 
they were limited to an ex post control of decisions made by other persons.”88 
The single-tier board is also structured to make faster decisions. Because the 
management and supervisory board are combined, there is no need for  separate approval 
                                                        
85 Carsten E. Jungmann, The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board 
Systems – Evidence from the UK and Germany, Eur. Company Fin. L. R., Vol. 3. at 64 (2006); Smith at 16. 
86 Jungman 60-64  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
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of decisions. Perhaps most importantly, formal board meetings take place more regularly 
allowing more responsive decisionmaking. 
Finally, the combination of more frequent meetings and the unity of the 
management and supervisory board allows more integration into the business strategy 
and decision making between the directors and management. When the CEO is on the 
board and there is a diverse array of business backgrounds on the board (as previously 
discussed the vast majority of all board members are corporate executives, financial 
executives, lawyers, accountants and consultants), there is a higher likelihood of 
understanding the intricacies of each business decision. 89  This skill set also allows 
independent directors to be better placed to challenge any potential problems in strategy 
proposed by management. Better familiarity with the business may help the board make 
better decisions.  
1.10 Disadvantages of a Single-Tier Board  
The primary disadvantage of the Single-Tier board is that it has to simultaneously 
make and monitor the same decision. Mere independence may not be enough to make a 
board member neutral, in particular when the board is small, there are substantial 
personal relationships with the board members, and compensation of the board member is 
directly tied to company performance90.  
There is another concern that the effectiveness of corporate control depends on 
the personality “of both the non-executive directors….and the chairman.” The personality 
of the chairman can be particularly dangerous in the American context if there is a joint 
CEO/chairman of the imperial variety. Increasing resistance to the imperial CEO by ISS 
and institutional investors has made this less of a problem. Nonetheless, non-executive 
directors must have both the knowledge base and self-confidence to directly stand up to 
the CEO/chairman to prevent domination of the board by the CEO.  
There is also concern of the existence of a “serial director.” If the independent 
director is an executive director on another board, they may be less likely to engage in                                                         
89 An important caveat to this point is what Martin Lipton described as the increasing “balkanization” of the 
board into autonomous committees. See Calkoen at 160. As board-monitoring standards have been 
heightened, there are greater barriers to understanding such complex and specialized responsibilities such 
as those performed by the audit committee. The rise of the “multi-tiered” board, as discussed in Part IV, is 
perhaps undermining one of the greatest strengths of the single-tier board.  90 Part III will discuss the conflicting literature on compensation of directors in-depth 
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effective monitoring if they wish for there to be more relaxed monitoring on their own 
board.91 This “boys club” effect may not be prevented by mere independence.  
Finally, personal relationship can play a major role in both appointment and 
effective monitoring. In a world where over half of independent directors are outside 
executives, it is unclear if boards are truly “independent” or if they are just boys clubs of 
executives, bankers & advisors. Even independent directors may be reluctant to expose 
the failings of a peer or friend in the boardroom. Delaware case law has heightened the 
independence test, but personal relationships that develop in the boardroom likely cannot 
be prevented without an unrealistic independence standard.92 The personal relationships 
that can encourage the flow of information between the board and the company’s 
management can potentially serve as a double-edged sword. Monitoring may be more 
difficult when there are feelings of gratitude or norms of social deference to colleagues.93 
Independent directors, even though acting in good faith, are also likely to be impacted by 
their preferences due to “uncontrollable cognitive processes.”94 These personal biases 
may exist in two-tier boards, but they are particularly problematic in one-tier boards 
when independent directors are attempting to supervise management whom they 
consistently work and socialize with on the same board.  
II. The German Corporate Board 
This part of the paper will first describe the legal framework (A.) and two-tier 
structure in Germany (B.), before highlighting its historic development (C.), the 
consequential systemic effects (D.) and finally analyzing the state of convergence 
between the systems (E.). 
                                                        
91 Grit Tungler, Anglo-American Board of Directors and the German Supervisory Board - Marionettes in a 
Puppet Theatre of Corporate Governance or Efficient Controlling Devices, 12 Bond L. Rev. at 264 (2000). 
92 See fn.8 on In re Oracle Corp.  
93 See Tungler at 264. 94 Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Directors Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237 
(2009) (arguing that independent directors are likely to be influenced by uncontrollable preferences and 
that heightened judicial scrutiny of independent director decisions are necessary)  
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2 Legal Framework in Germany 
In the tradition of civil law countries, corporate law in Germany is based on a wide 
variety of statutory regulations and the non-statutory German Corporate Governance 
Code (Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, “GCGC”)95. 
Some statues with wide discretion allow certain company forms to adopt a voluntary 
two-tier structure.96 If implemented, the company’s articles of incorporation govern it. A 
European limited-liability company (Societas Europaea, “SE”) may also choose its own 
board system, then governed by the Council Regulation on the SE97 as well as the 
German Implementation Act98. The GCGC may be applicable for public companies, but 
deviation is possible.99 
Other statutes such as the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, “AktG”)100 
make a two-tier system for limited companies (Kapitalgesellschaften) mandatory. 101 
There is almost no digression allowed in the articles from the statutory composition and 
tasks.102 Difference from the self-regulatory GCGC in public companies must always be 
explained. Also, codetermination laws103 as well as state supervision of certain industries                                                         
95 German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, “GCGC”), last amended 
on 5. May 2015, published on 12. June 2015 (Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger, “BAnz”), AT B1). 
96 Partnerships (Personengesellschaften), foundations (Stiftungen), and associations (Vereine). 
97 Art. 38 lit. b Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of 8. October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
company (“SE-VO”), as published on 11. November 2001 (Official Journal of the European Communities 
(“OJEC”) 2001, L 294/1). 
98 German SE Implementation Act (SE-Ausführungsgesetz, “SEAG”) as published on 22. December 2004 
(Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt, “BGBl.”) 2004, I, 3675), last amended by Art. 14 of the Law of 
24. April 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 642). 
99 No. 1 subpara. 7, 8, 10 & 12, No. 3.10 GCGC; v. Werder, Axel, in: Ringleb, Henrik-Michael; Kremer, 
Thomas; Lutter, Marcus; v.Werder, Axel (Editors), Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance 
Kodex, 5th edition, München, No. 1, recital 89 (2014). 
100 German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, “AktG”), as published on 6. September 1965 (BGBl. 1965, 
I, 1089), last amended by Art. 1 of the Law of 22. December 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 2565). 
101 Companies limited by shares (Aktiengesellschaft, “AG”) and partnerships limited by shares 
(Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, “KGaA”); partial applicability of the AktG besides other statues in 
companies with limited liability (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, “GmbH”), mutual insurance 
organizations (Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit, “VVaG”), and registered cooperative societies 
(eingetragene Genossenschaft, “eG”). 
102 So called Satzungsstrenge, section 23 para. 5 AktG. 
103 German One-Third Participation Act (Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz, “DrittelbG”) as published on 18. May 
2004 (BGBl. 2004, I, 974), last amended by Art. 8 of the Law of 24. April 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 642); 
German Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz, “MitbestG”) as published on 4. May 1976 (BGBl. 
1976, I, 1153), last amended by Art. 7 of the Law of 24. April 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 642); German Act on 
Codetermination in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industry (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz, “Montan-MitbestG”) 
as published in a revised version (BGBl. III, 801-2), last amended by Art. 5 of the Law of 24. April 2015 
(BGBl. 2015, I, 642). 
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(i.e. banking or insurance104) can affect the composition and tasks of the boards in a two-
tier structure. 
3 Germany’s mandatory Two-Tier Board System 
Within Germany’s mandatory two-tier structure, the executive directors in the 
management board (Vorstand) decide about the company’s objectives and implement the 
necessary measures.105 Meanwhile, the non-executive directors in the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) monitor these decisions on behalf of other parties.106 
3.1 The Management Board 
The members of the management board are appointed107 and dismissed for cause108 
by the supervisory board.109  The number of board members varies according to the 
company’s size, the applicability of codetermination rules and statutes in the articles 
between one or more persons, averaging in 2012 on 5.6 members.110 
While the management board also represents the company in and out of court111, it 
is their main responsibility to jointly run the business.112 Thus, the management board 
provides the strategic direction for the company through careful planning of                                                         
104 For banks: mainly German Banking Act (Gesetz über das Kreditwesen, „KWG“) as published on 9. 
September 1998 (BGBl. 1998, I, 2776), last amended by Art. 16 of the Law of 20. November 2015 (BGBl. 
2015, I, 2029); for insurances: mainly German Insurance Supervision Act (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz, 
“VAG”) as published on 1. April 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 434), last amended by Art. 3 No.1 of the Law of 21. 
December 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 2553); both industries controlled by federal financial supervisory authority 
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzaufsicht, “BaFin“). 
105 Jungmann, Carsten, The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board 
Systems - Evidence from the UK and Germany, European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 
4, 426 - 474, 437 (2006); Roth, Marcus, Corporate Boards in Germany; in: Davies, Paul; Hopt, Klaus; 
Nowak, Richard; van Solingen, Gerard (Editors), Corporate Boards in Law and Practice: A Comparative 
Analysis in Europe, Oxford, 253 - 364, 303 (2013). 
106 No. 1 subpara. 4 f. GCGC. 
107 Section 84 para. 1 AktG. 
108 Section 84 para. 3 sent. 1 AktG. 
109 1. Exception GmbH under DrittelbG: mandated to shareholders, section 46 No. 5 German Limited 
Liability Companies Act (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, “GmbHG”) as 
published in a revised version (BGBl. III, 4123-1), last amended by Art. 5 of the Law of 22. December 
2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 2565); 2. Exception KGaA: the general partners form the management board, 
sections 278 para. 1, 283 AktG. 
110 Section 76 para. 2 AktG; Monopolies Commission, Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte - 
Zwanzigstes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GWB, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Drucksache 18/2150, 17. July 2014, 226 (2014). 
111 Section 78 para. 1 sent. 1 AktG; i.e. standing for contesting action section 245 No. 4 & 5 AktG. 
112 Sections 76 para. 1, 77 para. 1 AktG. 
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operations.113 It also manages the workforce, coordinates tasks and controls the strategic 
focus of the company.114 Its tasks involve i.e. maintaining the books of account115 and 
keeping themselves 116 , the supervisory board 117 , the shareholders 118  and federal 
authorities119 informed about the state of the company. 
3.2 The Supervisory Board 
3.2.1 Appointment, Size & Composition 
The shareholders usually appoint the members of the supervisory board during 
their annual meeting (Hauptversammlung, “general meeting”).120 If codetermination laws 
must be applied, depending on the size of the workforce one third121 or one half122 of the 
board members are elected by the employees.123 In addition, certain shareholders may be 
granted the right in the articles to directly dispatch up to one third of the shareholding 
representing members of the board.124 Whoever appoints the board member may also 
remove them by decision.125 
The total number of board members can range from 3 to 21 members depending 
on the amount of share capital, the influence of codetermination and the articles of the 
company.126 In codetermined, listed companies, at least 30% of the supervisory board                                                         
113 No. 4.1.2 GCGC. 
114 Witt, Peter, Vorstand, Aufsichtsrat und ihr Zusammenwirken aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht; in: 
Hommelhoff, Peter; Jopt, Klaus, v. Werder, Axel (Editors), Handbuch Corporate Governance - Leitung 
und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis, 2nd edition, Köln, 
303 - 319, 304 f. (2009). 
115 Section 91 para. 1 AktG. 
116 I.e. setting up suitable surveillance measures within the company, section 91 para. 2 AktG, No. 4.1.4 
GCGC. 
117 Section 90 AktG, No. 3.2 GCGC. 
118 I.e. set annual meeting, sections 92 para. 1, 121 para. 2 sent. 1 AktG, No. 2.3.1 GCGC; submit financial 
statements, sections 179 para. 1 sent 1, 175 para. 1 sent. 1 AktG, No. 2.2.1 GCGC; inform about the state of 
the company, section 131 AktG; profit distribution proposal, sections 121 para. 3 sent. 1, 179 para. 1 sent. 1 
AktG. 
119 I.e. change in board membership, 181 para. 1 sent. 1 AktG; the increase of share capital, section 184 
para. 1 sent. 1 AktG; or the compliance with the GCGC, section 161 para. 1 sent. 1 AktG. 
120 Sections 100 para. 1 sent. 1, 119 para. 1 No. 1 AktG. 
121 500 - 2000 employees, section 4 para. 1 DrittelbG 
122 Above 2000 employees, section 7 para. 1 MitbestG. 
123 Section 5 para. 2 DrittelbG, sections 9, 15 - 18 MitbestG; section 6 Montan-MitbestG. 
124 Section 101 para. 1 sent. 1 & 4 AktG; not possible in a eG, Lutter, Marcus, Krieger, Gerd, Rechte und 
Pflichten des Aufsichtsrats, 5th edition, Köln, recital 15 (2008). 
125 Section 103 para. 1 sent. 1 AktG. 
126 Section 95 AktG, section 7 MitbestG, sections 4 para. 1, 9 Montan-MitbestG.  
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members need to be female and respectively male. 127  Besides codetermination and 
diversification, the composition of the board is determined by additional factors: the 
expertise of the members128, a limit on the amount of parallel supervisory board mandates 
of each member129 and, most importantly, the prohibition of a simultaneous seat on the 
management board130. Other personal requirements can only be requested in the articles 
for members appointed by the general meeting.131 
Thus, the supervisory board members can represent (1) shareholders, 
(2) employees, (3) labor unions132 , (4) the company’s group holdings133 , (5) business 
partners, (6) creditors or (7) state representatives134. 
3.2.2 Tasks 
On the one hand, the supervisory board controls the decision of the management 
ex post.135 The supervisory board reviews the management by inspecting the books136, 
reviewing the annual report137, issuing and overseeing the work of an external auditor138, 
analyzing the information provided by the management board139 and reporting to the 
general meeting140. In addition, the supervisory board also has standing for court actions 
against the management.141 
                                                        
127 Section 96 para. 2 sent. 1, para. 3 AktG, section 7 para. 3 MitbestG, section 5a Montan-MitbestG; 
Exception DrittelbG: regardless of listing same representation as segmentation in workforce, section 4 para. 
4 DrittelbG. 
128 No. 5.4.1 subpara. 1 GCGC; If capital market oriented: accounting or auditing skills, section 100 para 5 
AktG. 
129 Section 100 para. 2 sent. 1 No. 1 AktG, not more then 10 parallel mandates. 
130 Section 100 para. 1 AktG. 
131 Section 100 para. 4 AktG. 
132 Elected in codetermined companies as part of the employee representation, section 7 para. 2 MitbestG, 
section 6 para. 3 Montan-MitbestG. 
133 Compare section 100 para. 2 sent. 2 AktG. 
134 Compare sections 394, 395 AktG; 2012: 11.4% supervisory seats, Monopolies Commission, 226 (2014). 
135 Section 111 para. 1 AktG; Berrar, Carsten, Die zustimmungspflichtigen Geschäfte nach § 111 Abs. 4 
AktG im Lichte der Corporate Governance-Diskussion, Der Betrieb, 2181 - 2186, 2181 (2001). 
136 Section 111 para. 2 sent. 1 & 2 AktG. 
137 Section 171 para. 1 sent. 1 AktG. 
138 Sections 111 para. 2 sent. 3, 170 para. 1 & 2, 171 para. 1 AktG, No. 7.2.2 GCGC. 
139 Section 90 para. 1 AktG. 
140 Sections 118 para. 3 sent. 1, 124 para. 3 sent. 1, 171 para. 2 AktG. 
141 Section 112 AktG. 
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On the other hand, the supervisory board can influence the management board to 
exert ex ante control.142 While it cannot directly interfere in the management of the 
company143, the articles or the supervisory board must name certain important actions 
that can only be performed with the consent of the supervisory board.144 These are, for 
example, the extension of credits from the company to members of one of the boards145 
or measures that fundamentally change the assets or projected earnings of the 
company146. Furthermore, other ways to influence management exist for the supervisory 
board, for example, by setting incentives through the remuneration147 and regular advise 
on strategic decisions.148 
Another function of the supervisory board is the balancing of all interests present in 
the company by networking with business partners, shareholders, employees and 
creditors.149 
3.3 The General Meeting 
The general meeting of shareholders is the third organ in a limited company.150 Yet, 
only the supervisory board can preemptively monitor the management board as the 
general meeting can only act after misconduct occurred. 151  Possible actions include 
resolutions about important company decisions and the appointment of the supervisory 
                                                        
142 Malik, Fredmund, Die Neue Corporate Governance - Richtiges Top-Management - Wirksame 
Unternehmensaufsicht, 3rd edition, Ulm,186 f. (2002); Oetker, Hartmut, Vorstand, Aufsichtsrat und ihre 
Zusammenarbeit aus rechtlicher Sicht, in: Hommelhoff, Peter; Jopt, Klaus, v. Werder, Axel (Editors), 
Handbuch Corporate Governance - Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis, 2nd edition, Köln, 277 - 301, 281 (2009).  
143 Section 111 para. 4 sent. 1 AktG. 
144 Section 111 para. 4 sent. 2 AktG; if no consent is given the management board can ask for the consent 
(3/4 approval of given votes) of the general meeting, section 111 para. 4 sent. 3 - 5 AktG. 
145 Sections 89, 115 AktG, No. 3.9 GCGC. 
146 No. 3.3 sent. 2, 5.1.1 sent. 2 GCGC. 
147 Set by the supervisory board, section 87 para. 1 AktG, No. 4.2.3 GCGC. 
148 No. 5.1.1 sent.1 GCGC; Berrar, Der Betrieb, 2181, 2181 (2001); Jungmann, 3 ECFR, 426, 433 (2006). 
149 Hopt, Klaus; Leyens, Patrick, Board Models in Europe - Recent Developments of Internal Corporate 
Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, European Company and 
Financial Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 135 - 168, 141 (2004); Jungmann, 3 ECFR, 426, 432 (2006). 
150 Hoffmann, in: Spindler, Gerald; Stilz, Eberhard (Editors), Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 3rd edition, 
München, section 118 AktG, recital 6 (2015). 
151 Zattoni, Alessandro; Cuomo, Francesca, How Independent, Competent and Incentivized Should Non-
executive Directors be? An Empirical Investigation of Good Governance Codes, British Journal of 
Management, Vol. 21, 63 - 79, 74 (2010). 
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board or auditor.152 Statutory liability153 of the boards is limited by a business judgment 
rule and the exculpation of the boards for the last fiscal year by the general meeting.154 
Disclosure155, the market for corporate control156 and incentives in contracts are further 
control devices of the shareholders. 
4 Historic Development 
4.1 Path Dependency 
One explanation for the historic development of Germany’s corporate law system 
can be found in a “mixture of economic, political and cultural factors”157. These inherited 
norms and values continuously shape a systems development like a path.158 
The legal situation in Germany, in which the first modern companies emerged, was 
one in which neither a one nor a two-tier system was obligatory. 159  Instead, the 
management board was seen as an officer of the shareholders, while (if implemented) the 
supervisory body was nothing more than a shareholder committee. But as the social view 
changed, the managers started to consider all stakeholder interests.160 Subsequently, it 
was in the interest of the shareholders to have a separate supervisory body to control a 
management that considers other interests besides theirs. Moreover, it was also in the 
interest of all other stakeholders to have a separate control unit for the management. An 
independent board could check if the management actually considered their interests, as                                                         
152 Section 119 para. 1 AktG.  
153 Sections 48, 93, 116, 117, 399 - 405 AktG, No. 3.8. subpara. 1 sent. 2 GCGC. 
154 Sections 93 para. 1 sent. 2, 119 para. 1 AktG. 
155 Diamond, Douglas; Verrecchia, Robert, Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital, The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1325 - 1359, 1348 (1991); Bauwhede, Heidi; Willekens, Marleen, Disclosure on 
Corporate Governance in the European Union, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 16, 
No. 2, , 101 - 115, 103 (2008); Cormier, Denis; Ledoux, Marie; Magnan, Michel; Walter, Aerts, Corporate 
governance and information asymmetry between managers and investors, Corporate Governance: The 
international journal of business in society, Vol. 10, No. 5, 574 - 589, 575 (2010). 
156 Baums, Theodor, Der Aufsichtsrat - nützlich, schädlich, überflüssig? Working Paper No. 7, Institut für 
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, Osnarbrück, 5 (1994). 
157 Baums, Theodor, Corporate Governance Systems in Europe - Differences and Tendencies of 
Convergence - Crafoord Lecture, Working Paper No. 37, Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 
Osnarbrück, 9 (1996). 
158 Roe, Mark, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 109, 1996, 641 - 
668, 646 f. (1996). 
159 Baums, Theodor; Scott, Kenneth, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in 
the United States and Germany, Working Paper No. 119, Institut für Bankenrecht, Frankfurt, 28 (2003). 
160 Baums, Working Paper 7, 6 (1994). 
 28
shareholders still employ it. 161  With a law revision in 1897, the new cultural 
understanding was transformed into legal practice. Instead of a state permit system that 
before had served to protect all stakeholders162, a mandatory two-tier structure for limited 
companies was introduced.163 
Like many other legal ideas in the 19th century, the idea of strictly separating 
management and control stems from the academic study of the Roman legal system.164 
Even though the Romans did not know limited companies in the modern 
understanding165, they promoted the separation of “gestio” (execution) and “election, 
instruction et custodia” (election, instruction and supervision).166 Therefore, an example 
of how the desire to follow an historic ideal shaped the modern German corporate law 
system. 
Similarly the laws on codetermination have been influenced by cultural changes. 
Workers demanded “industrial democracy” 167  and more influence, threatening wide 
reaching strikes in the then largest German industry of coal and steel production. Thus, 
the Acts on Codetermination were first in the form of the Montan-MitbestG introduced in 
this industry in 1952 and slowly extended to other branches of industry in the following 
decades.168 
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Nowadays, the new corporate law regulations from the European Union (“EU”) 
promote the political goal of a level playing field for all companies and stakeholders.169 
Thus, the SE was introduced to allow companies to undertake business on an EU wide 
scale.170 Hereby, the option to choose a board system was implemented as a compromise 
between EU members.171 This development was thus also shaped by social and political 
factors. 
4.2 Efficiency 
Another approach to explain the development of a specific system is to focus on the 
economic strive for efficiency.172 Shareholders will try to maximize their profits.173 Thus, 
they will avoid a sub-optimal corporate governance system. Shareholder pressure then 
entices improvement of a company’s governance and in consequence creates liquidity for 
it from capital markets.174 
An explanation why incorporating supervision is efficient is derived from Agency 
Theory. As executive control of the company is given to managers instead of 
shareholders, exploitation possibilities emerge for the management, which runs the risk 
of lowering shareholder’s return. Thus, the separation of interests produces agency costs, 
which can be lowered through control. 175  It is also more cost efficient to focus 
supervision in the hands of someone specialized, than for each shareholders to employ it 
themselves. 176  Additionally in Germany, a traditional lack of minority shareholder                                                         
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protection has led to large block-holdings as the more efficient investment choice.177 As a 
consequence, less liquid capital markets evolved that made it harder to quickly change 
unsatisfying investments. Therefore, direct corporate control is needed to counterbalance 
immobility and a specialized, separate board, untainted by conflicts of interest related to 
the management, seems a rational choice.178 
Resource Dependence Theory offers another explanation based on efficiency 
considerations. It states that external resources available to the company affect its 
behavior.179 As a company depends on employees, the most effective compromise in 
Germany to permanently secure this external resource was codetermination. Another 
necessary resource is outside capital. Because debt financing by banks was more 
prominent in Germany than equity financing180, bank representatives on the supervisory 
board were seen as beneficial. The company could continuously inform them about the 
state of the company and positively effect refinancing decisions. Thus, stakeholder 
instead of shareholder orientation of both boards allows for the most efficient 
procurement of resources in Germany. 
But these solutions are only efficient in the historic circumstances set by society and 
law. Therefore one more explanation is delivered by Contingency Theory, which states, 
that a system develops within the boundaries of its path, always searching for the most 
efficient solution in light of the path’s circumstances.181 
5 Consequences of a mandatory Two-Tier System 
5.1 Efficient Monitoring through Separation 
A separate board with the power to influence management through consent, advise 
and incentives is an effective, preemptive form of monitoring.182  Another important 
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monitoring task is the supervision of executive actions, where effectiveness depends on 
(1) independence from management, (2) information access and (3) overcoming 
operational challenges. 
5.1.1 Independence 
Because of a “natural self justification tendency” 183  a supervisor can never 
efficiently monitor his own decisions. Therefore, this conflict of interest should always be 
avoided by exerting control through someone who is independent of the day-to-day 
management.184 This can be a separate supervisory board that does not meet with the 
same frequency as the management.185 
Another conflict of interest is created if the executive managers have influence on 
the selection of the supervisor. Monitoring might be limited in fear of dismissal.186 In the 
German two-tier system, management cannot exert influence on the employees’ board 
seats, though employee representatives are due to their workforce connection also not 
truly independent. 187  If the management also holds shares a management nominated 
supervisor could be elected.188 As the required majority may only be lowered in the 
articles through another majority vote, both votes serve to ensure that the election is in 
the interest of all shareholders.189 In order to reduce possible management influence                                                                                                                                                                      
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further, the supervisory board should also include an adequate number of independent 
members to compensate the possible dependence of the others.190 Furthermore, in 2013 
on average 97% of all supervisory boards established a joint nomination committee of 
shareholder representatives to propose qualified candidates to the general meeting in a 
transparent process. 191  A majority of three fourths required for a dismissal of a 
supervisory board member further reduces a single shareholder’s influence.192 
Thus, the German corporate governance system gives personnel authority to those 
stakeholders in whose interest control is performed - freeing supervisors from personal 
dependence to the management. In 2011 the supervisory boards of the 100 biggest 
German companies averaged 21% independent directors, 49% employee representatives, 
8% direct shareholder nominations, 5% former executives and 19% other non-
independent mandates.193 
5.1.2 Information Asymmetry 
Although independence from management is important, an uninvolved supervisor 
might lack the information or knowledge needed to exert efficient supervision on 
executive actions. 
One problem arising from the remoteness of the separate supervisory board is a 
lack of insider business knowledge. It is harder to comprehend, efficiently evaluate and 
objectively contribute to management actions if economic considerations and alternatives 
are not presented and understood by the board.194 Consequently, the supervisory board 
should be composed of capable members who receive regular further training. 195 
Moreover, they need to get to know the company inside and outside the boardroom.196                                                         
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Another option to ensure knowledge about the business is the appointment of former 
members of the management.197 But their number is limited to two198, as the direct 
relation to the management might affect their independence and hinder the removal of 
previous strategic mistakes.199 
The information asymmetry is even more pronounced when the supervisory board 
is solely dependent on the management as a source of information.200 The management 
board has an obligation to regularly provide specific information and special reports if 
requested.201 However this means, that management handles all information, tainting it 
with their personal opinion on what should be emphasized or even reported at all.202 
Therefore, the risk of inefficient control due to a lack of information is increased.203 Yet, 
the right of the supervisory board to inspect all documentation of the company in person 
reduces the information asymmetry.204 A reduction is also achieved by implementing 
specific board practices, such as defining which data to collect or when exactly in which 
form the management should deliver comprehensive information.205 The members of the 
management board also regularly join the entirety of the supervisory board meeting and 
may provide information there as well or can be subjected to further questions.206 
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5.1.3 Operational Challenges 
A third aspect of effective supervision lies in the ability of a board to overcome 
operational challenges that may hinder monitoring. That includes implementing routines 
that guarantee independence and the flow of information. But it also is the ability to ask 
critical questions and solve interpersonal conflicts such as defensive management 
behavior or other group dynamics.207 The chairman of the supervisory board hereby 
fulfills an important intermediate position, as he coordinates work with the management 
board through regular meetings.208 Conducting regular evaluations can also help to raise 
awareness of all members of the boards to the importance of addressing operational 
challenges and information asymmetries.209 
5.2 Implications specific to Germanys Corporate Law System 
Additionally, systemic factors such as codetermination, ownership structure, bank 
influence and stakeholder orientation also have implications on the German governance 
structure. 
5.2.1 Codetermination 
Through codetermination shareholder influence on a company is diluted.210 But 
social peace and a reduced strike risk are seen as a worthy gain that cannot be achieved 
otherwise as cost efficiently by contract.211 Shareholders also maintain the deciding vote 
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and fundamental decisions can still only be made by the general meeting.212 But mistrust 
could arise, if leaked information is used as a tactical advantage or if the management is 
reluctant to disclose information that goes against workers’ interest. 213  Thus, strict 
confidentiality rules are enforced on all214 and others are not allowed to join meetings.215 
Meetings may also be prepared separately, allowing each party to find common ground in 
their own ranks.216 
Though representatives are elected by and out of the workforce or unions, they 
still must be qualified.217 As they often come from a company’s middle management they 
usually possess an in-depth knowledge of the company that allows them to communicate 
its real needs and problems.218 Therefore, the diversification of knowledge may increase 
business opportunities.219 Yet, in a larger board of up to 21 members, averaging in 2013 
on 17 members220, a general consensus between all might be hard to find.221 In addition, a 
minimum of only four supervisory board meetings a year severely limits the possibility 
for contributions of each member.222 Division of tasks in board committees, for example 
an audit or remuneration committee can solve this dilemma partially.223  In 2013 on 
average 4.6 committees were installed on German supervisory boards.224 
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5.2.2 Ownership Structure 
Furthermore, ownership structure in Germany used to be block oriented, in 
comparison to a market oriented system in the U.S. with dispersed ownership.225 
One feature is interlocking, which occurs when board members also serve on 
other companies’ boards.226 On the one hand, this restricts direct competition and can 
bring fresh, expert views to the board.227 By being in demand companies and directors 
can also prove their worth on the job market.228 On the other hand, only keeping a small 
group in power might hinder the up rise of new economic ideas and cement class 
structures.229 Conflicts of interest can also occur if members sit on competitors’ boards. 
Therefore, the allocation of seats and allowed activities of board members are limited and 
restricted by the consent of the supervisory board and disclosure to the shareholders.230 
As board members with too many mandates might also not be able to properly fulfill their 
tasks, they need to assure they can muster enough time, as tasks cannot be mandated to 
others.231 Overall in 2013, 11% of all directors in Germany had 3 or more mandates on 
other boards.232 
Formerly prominent cross holdings between companies are also slowly 
diminishing.233 In the biggest 100 German companies 35 companies were invested into 
18 other companies in 2012.234 This shows a drop in capital investment from 143 in 1996 
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to 58 in 2012. 235  Additionally, on average other companies held 5.8% seats on 
supervisory boards.236 
Another still existing characteristic of Germany’s capital markets are large block-
holdings, leading to less liquid capital markets. Though financing can be achieved 
otherwise, the options are more limited than in a strictly market oriented system.237 
However, less liquid markets, lead to shareholder immobility and more enduring 
investments, thus allowing long-term value creation.238 Due to a favorable tax exemption 
on selling company stock in 2000 the large block-holdings were partially diluted.239 But 
still, families control 1/3 of the 30 biggest German companies.240 In these companies 
special approval rights and side-payments play an important role, leading to a less 
transparent market.241 In 2012 out of the 100 biggest companies in Germany 21 had a 
foreign controlling shareholder, 15 were controlled by the state, 26 by families, 8 had 
other controlling entities, 50 were in dispersed ownership with over 50% of shares traded 
and only 7 companies were without a controlling shareholder.242 
5.2.3 Influence of the Banking Sector 
As there is no institutional separation between commercial and investment 
banking in Germany243, universal banks can take on a simultaneous position of (1) 
depositary of voting rights, (2) shareholder and (3) creditor.244 Between these positions 
conflicts of interests can arise. Deposited shares could be voted in favor of an own 
agenda or always in favor of management proposals.245 On the other hand, the practice of 
giving banks seats on supervisory boards provides professional financial expertise to the 
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board.246 In theory, the insight in the state of the company could be used to accumulate 
supervisory costs and base a bank’s credit decisions on that knowledge.247 But there is 
little evidence that banks base these decisions on supervision248, instead using the board 
just as a tool to network.249 As critique of their position arose, they widely withdrew from 
boards of industrial companies.250 Their involvement fell over 80% in the last 20 years 
and in 2012 in the 100 biggest German companies only 1.4% of supervisory board seats 
were filled with bank representatives.251 The tax exemption of 2000 also allowed them to 
sell large shareholdings and new regulation limits the activities of depository voting and 
supplements it by a management run proxy system.252 From all German listed shares in 
2014 only 3.3% were still held by financial institutions.253 
5.2.4 Stakeholder Orientation 
One more aspect of the German system is its stakeholder orientation in comparison 
to the shareholder value approach in America.254 While the management board has wide 
discretion in the running of the business, it is bound to restrictions set by the supervisory 
board, the articles and basic255 or solicited256 decisions of the general meeting.257 This 
restriction follows from the fact that the management board is, on the one hand, an officer 
of the shareholders. Consequently, the codification of the German business judgment rule 
only refers to the shareholders best interest, and not the interests of the entire 
enterprise.258 But on the other hand, both boards due to a cultural understanding take into 
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account the interest of other stakeholders of the company as well. 259  Stakeholder 
orientation can help a company to fulfill its social responsibilities260 and concentrate on 
long-term value creation, increasing stability.261 In addition, it can encourage otherwise 
mostly passive shareholders to actively engage in the company to increase their share 
value.262 
III. The American and German Board Compared and 
Contrasted 
“Systems of corporate governance, like a society’s other important institutions, 
contain its cultural values.” 263 The differences in American and German governance 
standards portray contrasting corporate norms, and different understandings of 
capitalism. Below, we discuss how differences in (1) board size, (2) number of board 
meetings, (3) stakeholder versus shareholder interests, (4) independent versus 
representative directors and (5) director compensation are illustrations of these different 
corporate values which make each system of governance uniquely tailored to reflect each 
societies values. 
 
5.1 Board Size 
 One of the distinct differences between American and German boards is size. 
American boards average roughly 10.8 board members, while German boards are 
somewhere in the range of 23. The literature on board size suggests that American 
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companies should outperform German, but that is not necessarily the case. In fact, there 
is little evidence that either board has given a strategic advantage to corporations.264 
Eisenberg, echoing Lipton, points to two primary reasons why larger boards could 
hurt firm performance: (1) increased problems of communication and (2) decreased 
ability of the board to control management, leading to agency problems from the 
separation of management and control.265 It is important to note that Eisenberg also 
hypothesized that larger boards would have more independent directors, and that those 
directors would be highly risk adverse due to a negligible financial stake in the 
companies success, but substantial risk of reputational damage from a companies 
failure.266 German boards have fewer independent directors (on average 21%267), so it 
could be that the increased independence of the American one-tier board makes the 
American system less effective. It is also possible, though, that Eisenberg’s third critique 
is no longer relevant in light of the shifting compensation structures of directors that align 
firm performance with director compensation.268 
Eisenberg’s research found that “firms with small boards attain higher returns on 
investment in relation to their industry peers.” 269  Eisenberg does point to three 
alternative explanations for his findings: firms might increase board size due to poor 
profitability, large boards could just be a product of firms maturing in their life cycle or 
that large boards could be representative of problems endemic in the firm (citing the 
existence of bank representatives on boards with substantial debt).270  
A GMI study published in the Wall Street Journal 2014 found strikingly similar 
results to Eisenberg regarding board size and profitability. 271  The study found that 
amongst major American corporations, the stock of firms with smaller board                                                         264 See Jungman fn. 83 (finding no discernable difference between the performance of corporations with 
one-tier and two-tier boards in the UK and in Germany) (note however that no study has been done 
comparing American firms with one-tier boards to German firms with two-tier boards)  
265 Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren and Martin T. Wells. Larger board size and decreasing firm value 
in small firms, J. Fin. Econ at 37 (1998) 
266 id. at 38 
267 In the 100 biggest German companies, Roth, in: Davies et al, 253, 304 (2013) 
268 It may be the case that a directors’ compensation is not high enough relative to the directors overall 
income for these compensation changes to make a difference. In a world where roughly 50% of 
Independent directors are executives, their director compensation may be a small fraction of their overall 
income. Further study is needed in this area.  
269 id. at 45 
270 id. at 48 
271 Joann S. Lublin, Smaller Boards Get Bigger Returns, W.S.J., Aug. 26, 2014.  
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outperformed their peers by 8.5%.272 Some of the reasons cited in the article were that 
there is “more effective oversight of management” by smaller boards, smaller boards are 
more likely to dismiss their CEOs for poor performance and smaller boards are more 
likely to be “decisive, cohesive and hands-on.”273 
TheCorporateCounsel.net, run by Dave Lynn, one of the worlds’ leading 
attorneys on corporate governance, is also highly critical of large boards.274 Some of the 
advantages listed by smaller boards include:  greater flexibility, better interpersonal 
relationships, meetings tend to be more informal and individual directors are more likely 
to assume responsibility.275 The international data on board size also seems to suggest 
that firms with smaller boards tend to outperform similar firms with larger boards in both 
the United Kingdom and Asia.276 
Academics & practitioners both seem to overwhelmingly favor smaller boards, 
yet there seems to be little evidence that American boards outperform their German 
counterparts, even though German boards are on average twice as big. There are a few 
reasons why this perplexing conundrum may exist. First, what may matter is the size of 
the management board, and not the supervisory board. Although German boards are 
rather large, their management boards tend to only have around 6 members, which is 
quite small. It could be that the German two-tier board, by keeping its management board 
so small, has managed to incorporate the positive aspects of the smaller American one-
tier board entirely in its management board. A second explanation could be that large 
supervisory boards are so effective at monitoring the corporation that the negatives of the 
larger German board are outweighed by the positives of cleaner, less corrupt German 
corporations.277 A third potential explanation, such as the one proposed by Eisenberg, is                                                         
272 Id. 
273 id.  
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that independent directors are less willing to take risks than executive directors. Finally, 
one more answer is that there simply has not been enough research on the subject to make 
a definitive conclusion, and that further research comparing similarly situated German 
and American counterparts could lead to a conclusion more in line with the existing 
literature on board size.  
5.2 Board Meetings 
 One advantage of the American one-tier board often cited in the literature is that 
because there are more frequent board meetings in American versus German 
corporations, there are both better personal relationships on the board and a better 
diffusion of information between the directors and management. It is unclear if this 
conventional wisdom is actually true, however. Although German boards are required to 
meet at least 4 times per year, there are often more informal meetings or other meetings 
that go unreported. It may be the case that German boards nearly equally as frequently as 
their American peers informally, but there is little evidence to support this.278 
 One thing that is clear, however, is that similar to board size, the conventional 
wisdom in the literature is that more board meetings are better.279 Board meetings are 
seen as an important resource in improving board effectiveness, and that one of the most 
common problems that directors’ face is lack of time. 
5.3 Stakeholder v. Shareholder 
 The most obvious difference in German and American boards, other than size, is 
composition. American boards are overwhelmingly composed of independent directors 
that are either executives or members of the financial industry. German boards, by 
legislation and reflective of the German policy of codetermination, are required to reserve 
up to half of the seats on their supervisory board for employees. This board composition 
is reflective of the competing paradigms in American and German corporate governance: 
stakeholder versus shareholder primacy. 
                                                        278  
279 See Ivan E. Brick and N. K. Chidambaran. Board meetings, committee structure, and firm performance. 
Unpublished working paper, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108241 (November 2007); See Also 
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 In Germany’s two-tier system, the Codetermination Act of 1976 provides for a 
supervisory board of 12, 16 or 20, depending on the number of employees of the firm.280 
The average supervisory board size in Germany is 17.1, with the largest German firms 
maintaining the 20 person supervisory board. 281  The number of directors on the 
management board, however, is not subject to statutory regulation, and averages on 5.6 
members. The management board in Germany is comprised entirely of non-independent 
executives, with one executive being designated chairman or spokesperson. 282  The 
overall composition of the management board is also dependent on firm size and 
industry: Under the MitbestG there is “quasi-parity” codetermination with the deciding 
vote going to the chairman, and for the coal, iron and steel industries there is parity with 
the deciding vote going to an independent board member.283 The boards representation, 
composed of non-independent management directors, 1/2 employee supervisory 
directors, other stakeholder supervisory directors and 1/3 independent and shareholder 
supervisory directors, is broadly representative of the codetermination model entrenched 
in the GCGC, which states that “the company is to be managed in the interest of the 
enterprise” 284 , including employees and other stakeholder interests. 285  This view of 
corporate governance, echoed by Merrick Dodd and others, is entrenched in German 
corporate governance.  
 The American view of shareholder primacy is reflected in the unitary board 
structure as well as board composition. The board is seen as an independent supervisor, 
as opposed to a partly representative supervisor of stakeholders such as in Germany. 
American boards do not maintain seats for stakeholders such as employees like in 
Germany. Instead, American labor rights and other stakeholder interests are governed by 
contract and governmental regulation.286 Some, such as Marleen O’Connor, encouraged                                                         
280 Section Roth at 285; if Montan-MitbestG is applicable: largest size is 21; if DrittelbG is applicable no 
requirements are made for the size of the supervisory board. 
281 Roth at 287 
282 Roth at 288 
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285 This stands in contrast with Delaware law, where directors owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
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the United States to adopt director fiduciary duties to their employees.287 Many scholars 
favoring an abandonment of shareholder primacy embraced the German and Japanese 
codetermination models in the 1980’s when it appeared that corporate America was being 
outperformed by its German and Japanese peers. American economic performance in the 
1990’s and early 2000’s muted the influence of these scholars.  
 The purpose of this paper is not to say whether stakeholder or shareholder 
primacy is better or worse. The obvious should be noted however, that a corporation run 
for the benefit of shareholders is more likely to benefit shareholders, while a corporation 
run for the benefit of stakeholders such as employees is more likely to benefit 
stakeholders, at least in the short run. It is also important to note that neither governance 
system is entirely dominated by either norm, and that our narrative is built in part by 
making a generalization about two incredibly nuanced systems of corporate governance.  
5.4 Independence v. Representation 
German boards, reflecting stakeholder norms, are representative in nature, while 
American boards are independent. German boards directly represent stakeholder interests 
by having stakeholder oversight, while American boards represent shareholder interests 
by maintaining independent oversight.  
American board independence is a recent phenomenon, birthed out of judicial and 
managerial necessity as a response to “preserve managerial autonomy against the 
pressure of the market” during the 1980’s hostile takeover explosion.288 Prior to this 
emergence, American corporate norms tended to reflect modern German norms. During 
the 1950’s, called the “high-water mark of managerialism” in U.S. corporate governance, 
stakeholder capitalism was instituted in practice if not in legislation. 289  Corporate 
management felt a responsibility to act in the interest of employees and consumers, and 
was largely given free reign in the management of the company.290 The board, often 
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management picked executives or close company advisors such as outside counsel, was 
seen as having an “advisory” as opposed to a “monitoring” role.291 
 The rise of board independence, which was largely a response to the unbridled 
free-market capitalism of the “deal-decade” of the 1980’s, is now one of the defining 
characteristics of the more neo-liberal shareholder primacy model of corporate 
governance in America. The independent board responded to what Gordon described as 
the “three-way paradox” of norms promoting shareholder maximization, defense 
measures by corporate boards that prevented this shareholder maximization and the high 
cost of hostile bids and their associated agency problems.292  The independent board 
resolved this paradox by evaluating management performance based on stock market 
prices while simultaneously improving the agency problem by created independent board 
voices. 
 Developing in tandem with board independence has been the heightening of board 
monitoring requirements. The Enron collapse highlighted board-monitoring failures. 
Heightened independent director relationship and monitoring standards promulgated by 
the NYSE and the SEC, along with those imposed by the Court of Chancery, have placed 
an even larger burden on independent directors. This newly emergent dual mandate of 
enhanced monitoring duties to go with outside, independent advisory duties serves as the 
watchman overlooking modern American capitalism. 
 The German corporate norm of favoring stakeholders over independent directors 
is reflective of a different version of capitalism that favors stakeholder input and 
managerial expertise over independence. The management boards in Germany, which 
have the responsibility of setting corporate strategy, are almost entirely composed of 
executive directors with close ties to the corporation. Supervisory boards, which are 
responsible for monitoring and may advise on strategy, are overwhelmingly composed of 
employees (49%) and other non-independent executives (24%), with only 29% of 
directors being truly independent or shareholder nominated. 293  This model favors 
management expertise and stakeholder input over independent outsiders. The similarities 
in both structure and norms between 1950’s American corporate boards and modern                                                         
291 Id. at 1512-1522 
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German boards are striking, and highlight the changing landscape of American 
governance ideals.  
5.5 Compensation 
German and American board compensation structures both have potentially 
troubling incentives, but each in a way unique to their own governance systems. German 
and American boards also regulate director compensation very differently, further 
reflecting governance norms.  
In the United States, director compensation is set by the board in consultation with 
compensation experts. 294Board compensation in America is also becoming primarily 
incentive based.295 There is some scholarship that suggests incentive pay aligns director 
and shareholder interest, even when considering a long investment time horizon and 
expenditures such as Research and Development.296 Other advisory agencies such as 
Moody’s argue that incentive pay undermines director independence, creates an 
excessive focus on share price and creates incentives for boards to be less vigorous in 
regulating earnings materials.297 In general, governance trends in the United States at 
both the state and federal level have been heightening board independence, but director 
compensation trends have been moving in the opposite direction, potentially threatening 
this independence. If both outside directors and executives face the same compensation 
incentives to increase a company’s stock price, the outside directors’ ability to oversee 
management, and protect the shareholders, is put into jeopardy.  
 German compensation of the management board is set by the supervisory board, 
but governed by statute. 298  Management board compensation, although set by the 
supervisory board, must “bear a reasonable relationship to the duties of such members”, 
which has greatly limited compensation freedom of contract and made director 
                                                        
294 Susanne Craig, At Banks, Board Pay Soars Amid Cutbacks, N.Y. Times March 31, 2013 at Dealbook.  295 See Supra Section 1.5  
296 See Yuval Deutsch "The Influence of Outside Directors' StockOption Compensation on Firms' 
R&D, Corporate Governance: An International Review 15.5, 816,827 (2007) 297 Ken Bertsch, Francis Byrd and Mark Watson, The Downside of Incentive Pay for Outside Directors, 
Moody’s Investor Service: Special Comment, Report no. 97174 (April 2006) 
298 Section 87 para. 1 Stock Corporation Act 
 47
compensation subject to judicial review. 299  Supervisory board pay is also broadly 
governed by statute, but is set at the shareholders meeting.300  
Incentive based pay is becoming more prominent amongst German directors, but 
because board independence is not prioritized incentive pay does not threaten 
independence in the same way as it would on American boards. The supervisory boards 
composition of employees and management representatives (who set management board 
pay), raises other potential conflicts that might threaten both shareholders and the 
company, however. Many have described the so-called Faustian bargain on German 
boards between labor and management, where labor gives broad leeway to management 
(potentially ignoring their supervisory duties) in exchange for the protection of German 
jobs.301 German director compensation structures face the same poor set of incentives: the 
supervisory board, comprised of half labor representatives, may be willing to grant 
favorable compensation schemes to management in exchange for protection of German 
labor interests. Pay incentives on German boards highlight the dark side of stakeholder 
capitalism in Germany for shareholders; their interests, far from being equal to 
stakeholders such as labor and management, will be subjugated with little recourse 
outside of litigation. 302 
A recent paper by J. Travis Laster and John Mark Zeberkiewicz describes 
blockholder directors in American corporate governance, and is a useful vehicle for 
analyzing certain flaws in German compensation practices. 303Laster & Zeberkiewicz 
define a blockholder director as “when one or more directors have been designated by a 
particular class or series of stockholders or were appointed at the behest of an insurgent 
group” that is then perceived to be “exercising directorial powers for the benefit of a                                                         299 Stephen Harbath and Florian Kienle, Director Compensation under German Law and the Mannesman 
Effect, 3 Eur. Company L. 90,97 (2006) 300 Section 113 Stock Corporation Act (“such compensation may be set forth in the articles of association 
or granted by the shareholders’ meeting”).  
301 See Generally Chris Bryant and Richard Milne, Boardroom Politics at the Heart of the VW Scandal, 
F.T. October 4, 2015 (describing the critique that lax supervisory oversight of management was traded for 
German job protection) 302 German social norms on director pay and judicial review may be enough to prevent compensation 
abuse, but the incentives to create the possibility in the future of pay structured solely for management 
benefit.  303 J. Travis Laster and John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 Bus. 
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subset of the stockholder base.” 304 The authors argue that Delaware law rejects 
“constituency directors” that only represent a subset of the shareholder base, and 
highlights how fiduciary obligations of Delaware directors require all directors to 
“promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”305  
 Vice Chancellor Laster’s worst fears for Delaware are engrained common practice 
in Germany. Blockholder directors need not solely be understood as representing 
shareholders, but in the German context also stakeholder directors. Instead of a fiduciary 
obligation to act for all shareholders, however, blockholder directors such as labor allied 
directors in Germany have the ability to represent labor interests, which stands in stark 
contrast with the Delaware board-centric model resting on collective decisionmaking. 
Whenever there is a unity of labor and management interests that allow board alliances 
between the two, shareholder interests and recourse become subjugated. Without 
Delaware style fiduciary duties given to blockholders, there is always a threat that 
nebulous “company interests” will really be labor or management interests. The two-tier 
board structure as it exists in Germany is a particularly opaque vessel that could allow an 
alliance by blockholders for self-enrichment and scandal, and management board 
compensation seems a likely location for this plundering.306307 
German compensation practices are best considered yet another reflection of 
stakeholder primacy on the German board, and Germany’s two tier-structure creates the 
potential for abuse by vote-trading between the supervisory and management boards on 
compensation, as well as other board practices. Freedom of contract is limited by statute 
in Germany, probably out of necessity, because there is no private check on 
compensation practices like there is under Delaware law for shareholders.  Conversely in 
the United States, director compensation practices reflect shareholder primacy norms, but 
director independence may be undermined by incentive compensation. 
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IV. International Convergence of Board Standards 
5.1 International Convergence in Germany 
A cross-border diffusion of international governance norms has begun to impact 
both governance systems. The German two-tier system now allows more supervisory 
board oversight of management, while the American board is increasingly become multi-
tiered in function. 308  These changes reflect growing attempts by both systems to 
incorporate strengths of the other. This diffusion is being facilitated by economic 
globalization309, the strong external effects of rules set by U.S. equity markets310 and both 
shareholder and regulatory pushback for governance improvements. Some might predict 
the emergence of an international best practice of governance norms developing as part 
of this trend. Further convergence, however, is likely to be tepid at best.  
Some scholars have argued that instead of international best practices on 
governance norms developing, shareholder pressure will instead lead to a race to the 
bottom of minimum standards. 311  Other such as John C. Coffee have worried that 
piecemeal implementation of certain governance norms across cultures will be largely 
ineffective. 312  Finally, due to differing roles for stakeholders, governance norms 
acceptable in one country may never be acceptable in the other.313 There are strong 
cultural reasons, such as codetermination, that would likely prevent certain outcomes like 
the rise of truly independent boards in Germany.  
Hansmann and R. Kraakman noted “by their nature… [a firm] is strongly 
responsive to shareholder interests. [firms] do not, however, necessarily dictate how the 
interests of other participants in the firm […] will be accommodated”314. Both scholars 
predicted a decline of the two-tier board but also a simultaneous decline in shareholder 
primacy and greater stakeholder influence.315 Today, in Germany a trend towards more 
shareholder value protection can be observed, but there is little evidence of a shifting                                                         
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norm in Germany towards shareholder primacy, as evident by the use of a stakeholder 
encompassing definition in the GCGC.316 Corporate governance in Germany continues to 
structure a company’s managing and supervising tasks in a way that best facilitates the 
relationship between managers, board(s), shareholders and other stakeholders.317 
Both the German and America board systems have proven similarly efficient in 
each of their respective cultural systems.318 Despite the success of the two-tier board in 
Germany, many Germany scholars have promoted implementing an optional one-tier 
board structure for German corporations. 319  European regulators have already 
implemented this choice allowing a SE to choose between either structure. Every German 
company has the possibility to change their system to a less codetermined320, smaller one-
tier board. In the 12 years of its existence only 5 of the 100 biggest German companies 
chose the form of an SE in 2012.321 All 5 companies that did, however, chose a dualistic 
SE system with management and supervisory board.322 
5.2 The “1.5” Tier Board in America 
The American board has begun to reflect German two-tier model in function if not 
in form. The heightening of monitoring standards on boards following the passage of 
SOX has led to the American board increasing in both size and expertise. These 
heightened standards have required boards to delegate responsibilities increasingly to 
committees, which are growing in number, expertise and responsibility.323 The audit 
committee, for example, is only composed of a small number of independent directors 
with expertise in auditing. The board has effectively delegated the entire auditing                                                         
316 No. 1 subpara. 2 GCGC, based on the OECD definition. 
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the Supervisory nor Management board has an incentive to switch structures because such a move would 
inevitably lead to fewer employee representatives or non-independent executive directors on the board. 
Only the shareholders, whose representatives occupy minority seats on the supervisory board, would push 
for such a switch. Some have described the alliance between employee representatives and management as 
a “Faustian Bargain”, and these two stakeholders would block any move that would diminish both of their 
respective power.   
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supervisory responsibility to only two or three board members. The rise of committees 
along with the heightened monitoring standards may dull some of the primary advantages 
of the single-tier board by effectively marginalizing all other board members that lack the 
specialized knowledge of the committee. 324  This specialization hurts the flow of 
information on the board, and blunts one of the primary advantages of the one-tier board. 
The rise of executive sessions, which are separate meetings of the independent 
directors without the executive directors, is yet another example of the fraying of the one-
tier board into two or more tiers. Board meetings that are less inclusive of all board 
members stymie board cohesion and information flow. In this way, the American board 
may be better described as a “1.5” tier rather than a one-tier board. Supervisory duties, 
although not legally separate like in the German model, have been heightened and 
delegated to the point of constituting something unique, and substantively different than a 
unified one-tier board.  
V. Conclusion  
  
 The one-tier and two-tier board models of the United States and Germany reflect 
differing histories, governance norms and national aspirations. Substantial changes over 
the past 30 years to the American board has made American boards substantively far 
different than German boards, as they increasingly favor independence over 
representation and shareholders over stakeholders. In many ways, however, American 
boards are procedurally becoming more similar to their German counterparts. The 
heightened monitoring standards for boards and the rising importance of committees has 
made the one-tier board in America more akin to a multi-tiered board. 
 In Germany, corporations now have the choice of adopting the one-tier board 
model but very few have done so. It is possible that demand from the international 
financial markets will force the German system to conform more strongly with the 
American board structure, but it remains to be seen if this will be the case. As long as 
there is ambiguity over which model performs better, it is unlikely that either nation will 
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abandon their board structure and the cultural norms that each structure represents for the 
foreseeable future.  
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